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The Rhetoric and Ethics of Reading* 
Éva Antal 
The context of my research is given by my doctoral thesis on irony, where I 
studied several ironological (irony-theoretical) texts of primary importance. 
In the last part I analysed the irony-conceptions of the (modern) American 
New Criticism and the (postmodern) American deconstruction. Now I would 
particularly like to emphasise the fact that while I was studying those texts 
on irony, my attention gradually focused on deconstruction and the so-
called rhetoric of reading. The conclusion of my thesis is concerned with 
the (possible) ethics of reading, whereas the term was—and now in my 
paper is—borrowed from a Yale professor and critic, Joseph Hillis Miller, 
and his book, The Ethics of Reading. The study of this paradoxical term 
and its meanings—which we may look at suspiciously—leads to different 
reading techniques of modernism and postmodernism. I have used the word 
'techniques', but I had better say 'practices' of reading because both in the 
American modernist New Criticism and postmodern deconstruction, the 
practicality of theories is emphasised. I think that for us teachers, critics, 
writers and readers (sometimes) functioning as 'models' in our life it is really 
important to take these ideas into consideration. 
When we speak about deconstruction in the States, we feel compelled 
to indicate the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida's influence; immediately 
adding that Derrida does not name himself a deconstructionist and, actually, 
this something called deconstruction was born and brought up at the 
University of Yale in Paul de Man's, J. H. Miller's, Geoffrey H. Hartman's 
and Harold Bloom's, the four main deconstructors' work—of course, with 
Derrida's '(dis)seminating' step-fatherhood. In his Allegories of Reading de 
Man defines what the rhetorical means to him: 
* The first version of this text titled "The Ethics of Reading — a Postmo-
dern Theory?" was delivered as a plenary report at the international conference 
"Transformations of Ethics in the Contemporary Discourse", at Vilnius Pedagogical 
University ori 12 th May 2003. The final verifications were completed in autumn 2004 
with the assistance of a Deák Ferenc Scholarship supplemented by a grant from the 
Hungarian Ministry of Education (OM). 
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I follow the usage of common speech in calling this semiological enigma 
'rhetorical'. The grammatical model of the question becomes rhetorical 
not when we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning and on the 
other hand a figural meaning, but when it is impossible to decide by 
grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two meanings (that 
can be entirely incompatible) prevails. Rhetoric radically suspends logic 
and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential abberations. (de 
Man AR, 10) 
In the next sentence as antecedents, de Man refers not to Derrida's 
impact, but he mentions two modernist critics of the school named New 
Criticism: Monroe Breadsley and William Wimsatt, who also recognized 
the importance of the rhetorical in textual understanding. It also shows us 
that if we want to understand the rhetoric and later the ethics of reading, 
we have to map the preliminaries. That is, to understand the postmodern 
reading practice and its ethical implications, first, we need to know about the 
modernist view of reading, which gives the immediate context of American 
deconstruction. 
In America in the 1940s~50s, having realised that students could not 
do anything with pieces of literature (especially, with poems), university 
teachers—John Crowe Ransom, Robert Penn Warren, Rene Wellek, Allan 
Tate, William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks—developed and used a 
new method to analyse literary and philosophical texts. Besides practical 
textbooks written to students—eg. the famous 'understanding-series' (Un-
derstanding Poetry, Understanding Fiction)—their articles and studies were 
also concerned with the theory of literature, literary language and literary 
criticism; we can think of the well-known 'Wellek-Warren-book' titled 
Theory of Literature. Thus, it can be said that their mission—and they 
really took their work in such a way—made them immensely influential and 
productive. 
What was new in their criticism? They deliberately acted against the 
branches of contemporary criticism, such as sociological, biographical or 
philological criticism, and demanded a more systematic and more rigorous 
approach in reading. They claimed that literary language differed from any 
other kind of language; consequently, critics, teachers, students, that is, 
readers had to concentrate on the texts themselves. In their work, Literary 
Criticism, Wimsatt and Brooks define "the principle task of criticism— 
perhaps the task of criticism—is to make explicit to the reader the implicit 
manifold of meanings" (652). They also undertook the task of improving the 
readers, not the authors, by showing them the complexity and inexhaustible 
richness of the literary works. 
The key terms of their theoretically based approach are: "close 
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reading", structure and irony. That is, according to the New Critics, the 
text and its language are to be considered without any interest in the 
author's age or life; for example, in a poem we should pay attention only 
to the usage of language and the structure created. The real meaning of a 
literary text is given by and in its semantic structure, which is, on the one 
hand, dynamic—every poem is a little drama—showing the reconciliation 
of opposites; and on the other hand organic, that is, nothing is irrelevant. 
Thus, every detail contributes to the whole. As in his article, "The Heresy 
of Paraphrase", Brooks describes: "the structure meant is a structure of 
meanings, evaluations and interpretations; and the principle of unity which 
informs it seems to be one of balancing and harmonizing connotations, 
attitudes and meanings" (195). This poetic structure and its desired unity 
is not rational or logical, but—to use Brooksian similes—it resembles that 
of architecture or painting, a ballet or musical composition based cm the 
"pattern of resolved stresses" (Brooks WWU, 203). 
In poems, tension, conflicts and stresses are given by the 'problematic' 
elements, such as metaphors, symbols, paradoxes and other figures of speech, 
because they easily get their connotative meanings from the context. For 
example, Wimsatt in The Verbal Icon says that in a good metaphor "two 
clearly and substantially named objects . . . are brought into such a context 
that they face each other with fullest relevance and illumination" (111). In 
spite of the conflicting or opposing meanings by the end of the close reading, 
an equilibrium of forces, a unity is supposed to be given, and "this unity is 
not a unity of the sort to be achieved by the reduction and simplification 
appropriate to an algebraic formula. It is a positive unity, not a negative; 
it represents not a residue but an achieved harmony" (Wimsatt VI, 114-
115). Using the above mentioned drama-metaphor, it can be imagined as 
if the conflicting forces, more exactly the possible semantic (connotative) 
meanings of the words were fighting, and their tension resulted in a climax 
giving the theme, a leading idea or conclusion of a text. The whole process of 
close textual understanding is summarized in one word: irony. Nevertheless, 
in the modem New Criticism irony is overused. On the one hand, "it is 
the most general term that we have for the kind of qualification which, 
the various elements in a context receive from the context" (Brooks WWU, 
209); that is, irony necessarily operates in every context and in every reading 
process. On the other hand, by the end of our close reading of a text we 
have to reveal the work's (possible) "invulnerability to irony". As Brooks 
introduces this idea in the wonderful arch-simile: 
Irony, then, in this further sense, is not only an acknowledgement of 
the pressures of a context. Invulnerability to irony is the stability of a 
context in which the internal pressures balance and mutually support 
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each other. The stability is like that of the arch: the very forces which 
are calculated to drag the stones to the ground actually provide the 
principle of support—a principle in which thrust and counter thrust 
become the means of stability. (Brooks "Irony", 1044) 
Let us pay attention to two things here: first, the figurative language used by 
the new critics in their close reading/writ ing; secondly, their obsession with 
a wanted/wished equilibrium and totality in textual understanding. While 
the first phenomenon leads us to the deconstructive attack on New Criticism, 
the second one foreshadows the moral implications of close reading. 
Although the New Critics do not explicitly speak about ethical 
questions, for them poetry means "a way of knowing something: (if the 
poem is a real creation,) it is a kind of knowledge that we did not possess 
before"—as Allen Tate claims in The Essays of Four Decades adding: "it is 
not knowledge 'about' something else; . . .it is the fullness of that knowledge" 
(Tate 104-105). When Brooks says that, optimally, the ironical reading 
process results in "a unification of attitudes into a hierarchy subordinated 
to a total and governing attitude" (Wimsatt-Brooks LC, 380), he displays 
his totalizing and somewhat holistic, though dialectic, worldview. In the 
concluding paragraphs of his "Irony as a Principle of Structure" he confesses 
that in textual close reading "penetrating insights" can be gained and one 
of the uses of poetry is to make the readers "better citizens". But poetry, 
that is, a given figurative text, manages it relying on the expressed relevant 
particulars, not with the usage of abstraction. More accurately, it carries us 
"beyond the abstract creed into the very matrix from which our creeds are 
abstracted" (Brooks "Irony", 1048). Thus, specific moral problems can be 
the subject matter of literature, but the purpose of literature is not to point 
a moral. 
I suppose, it can be guessed that in close reading—due to the critics' 
concern with true knowledge and wisdom—"such qualities as wit, ambiguity, 
irony, paradox, complexity, and tension are valued for more than aesthetic 
reasons; they are indexes to the view of re edit y—and of man and truth— 
in the work. They are, therefore, not really aesthetic or rhetorical but, 
since they are modes of apprehending reality, ontological or, in the broad 
sense, religious" (Spears 240). What's more, in "Cleanth Brooks and the 
Responsibilities of Criticism" Monroe K. Spears sees the mission of New 
Critics grounded in the tradition of Christian humanism giving ontological 
meaning to their reading practice while their irony is taken religiously, or 
at least ethically. 
In the modernist close reading of New Criticism the belief in the 
possibility of order and the quest for order are emphasised, since in literature 
the reader is supposed to find true knowledge, "knowledge of a value-
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structured world" (Wellek 228). As Wellek quotes Brooks's claim, namely, 
poetry gives "a special kind of knowledge... through poetry, man comes 
to know himself in relation to reality, and thus attains wisdom" (Wellek 
229). The New Critics also have their belief in a strong sense of community 
expressed by the romantic idea of 'organic unity'. Actually, I characterised 
their reading technique as 'ironic' paying attention to the rhetorical forces 
of a given text, it is better called "irenic" striving for the equilibrium of 
those forces. Although we can find the New Critical approach quite positive 
and fruitful, we have to admit its basic idealistic naivity resulting from the 
modernist efforts aimed at solving the surrounding chaos of the world. Their 
desired vaulted arch symbolizing understanding can refer to perfection, but 
we cannot forget that it is suspended in the air between two solid, but 
imagined buildings. 
In his early critical writings (Blindness and Insight) Paul de Man, 
one of the four Yale-deconstructors, deals with this shift from 'close(d)' 
reading to the open—later with his term named as allegorical—reading. In 
his essay titled "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism" he says, 
though the New Critics noticed the importance of and paid attention to 
such distinctive features of literary language as ambiguity or irony, these 
structural elements themselves contradicted the very premises on which the 
New Criticism with its central "totalizing principle" was founded. In the 
key paragraph he describes this process: 
As it refines its interpretations more and more, American criticism 
does not discover a single meaning, but a plurality of significations 
that can be radically opposed to each other. Almost in spite of itself, 
it pushes the interpretative process so far that the analogy between 
the organic world and the language of poetry finally explodes. This 
unitarian criticism finally becomes a criticism of ambiguity, an ironic 
reflection on the absence of the unity it had postulated, (de Man BI, 
28) 
Actually, it seems as if de Man had thought over the new critical 
approach of reading—reading its theory closely—, and on the basis of its 
faults or 'blind spots' and 'insights' he developed his later ideas. According 
to de Man, the greatest mistake of New Criticism was, while they tried to 
pay "such patient and delicate attention to the reading of forms" (de Man 
BI, 29), the presupposed idea of totality forced them to find closed forms 
and to strive for order. It can be said that they simply used Heidegger's 
theory of hermeneutical circularity, but they forgot about the fact that the 
(hermeneutical) act of understanding is a temporal one. As de Man remarks: 
"yet, the temporal factor, so persistently forgotten, should remind us that 
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the form is never anything but a process on the way to its completion" 
(de Man BI, 28). And the symbol that can show the true nature of textual 
understanding is not the circle or the arch, but the spiral line that consists 
of seemingly closed/closing circles displaying the temporal and neverending 
process of understanding, that is, the rhetoric of temporality. 
In Blindness and Insight in the essay titled "The Rhetoric of Tempo-
rality", de Man regards allegory together with irony as the key rhetorical 
tropes in our (textual) understanding. Here he is concerned with the 
differences of the two rhetorical figures, which he defines in their relation 
to time. Though both show the discontinuous relationship between sign 
and meaning, the experience of time in the case of irony means "a 
synchronic structure, while allegory appears as a successive mode capable 
of engendering duration" (de Man BI, 226)—that is, it is diachronic. It 
is quite obvious why de Man feels obliged to distinguish the two tropes: 
he wants to resist, to get detached or differentiated from the new critical 
reading asserting that "the dialectical play between the two modes, as well 
as their common interplay with mystified forms of language . . w h i c h it is 
not in their power to eradicate, make up what is called literary history" (de 
Man BI, 226). We can guess that after the New Critical emphasis on irony 
as a basic principle, in the de Manian reading, allegory is given primacy. 
Having published his theoretical works, de Man starts to interpret/read 
philosophical and literary texts relying on his ideas of the rhetorical. In the 
greatest collection of his readings titled Allegories of Reading (its subtitle 
says: Figural language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust) he defines 
his rhetorical mode of reading: 
The paradigm for all texts consists of a figure (or a system of figures) 
and its deconstruction. But since this model cannot be closed off 
by a final reading, it engenders, in its turn, a supplementary figural 
superposition which narrates the unreadability of the prior narration. 
As distinguished from primary deconstructive narratives centered on 
figures and ultimately always on a metaphor, we can call such narratives 
to the second (or the third) degree allegories. Allegorical narratives tell 
the story of the failure to read, (de Man AR, 205) 
But I can immediately add that efforts are made again and again as 
we try to understand, try to read a text and its allegory. It means that in 
the background, not only in the texts but in language itself, there should 
be something that makes the different allegorical readings possible and also 
helps us readers accept the impossibility of a final reading. We 'need' this 
something that is essentially rhetorical; we need irony. As in the concluding 
sentences of his Allegories—in the chapter titled Excuses—de Man says: 
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"Irony is no longer a trope but the undoing of the deconstructive allegory 
of all tropological cognitions, the systematic undoing, in other words, of 
understanding. As such, far from closing off the tropological system, irony 
enforces the repetition of its aberration" (de Mem AR, 301). 
Now, after this long—but I hope necessary and not uninteresting— 
digression on reading, the most important question comes: what happened 
to the possible covert moral implication of the New Criticism in de Man's 
reading? I should claim that in the rhetorical deconstructive reading it has 
become overt; what's more, it has become evident. In his readings de Man 
speaks about the "practical ethical dimension of allegory" (de Man AR, 209) 
and he also says that "allegories are always ethical" (de Man AR, 206). The 
famous quotation reads as follows: 
Allegories are always ethical, the term ethical designating the structural 
interference of two distinct value systems. In this sense, ethics has 
nothing to do with the will (thwarted or free) of a subject, nor a fortiori, 
with a relationship between subjects. The ethical category is imperative 
(ie., a category rather than a value) to the extent that it is linguistic and 
not subjective. Morality is a version of the same language aporia that 
gave rise to such concepts as 'man' or 'love' or 'self', and not the cause 
or the consequence of such concepts. The passage to an ethical tonality 
does not result from a transcendental imperative but it is referential 
(and therefore unreliable) version of a linguistic confusion. Ethics (or, 
one should say, ethicity) is a discursive mode among others, (de Man 
AR, 206). 
First, in this luminous paragraph, before going into details, we can 
find three different words related to our chosen topic: morality, ethics 
and ethicity. I think de Man does not simply want to play on words, 
since the more ancient—or modern—word, morality, and its science, ethics, 
are differentiated from the postmodern term, ethicity.1 Although in their 
original meaning the words seem to refer to the same realm of the question of 
good versus wrong behaviour, from the common foundation the postmodern 
theory of ethics named ethicity gives rise to multiplicity. That is, in the 
word 'ethicity' we can see the deconstruct ion of ethics with preserving and 
questioning its aporetic roots. Despite the usual attack on deconstruction 
claiming that deconstruction turns from ethical problems in complete 
indifference, it rather turns to and regards such questions in their differences. 
1
 Moreover, in its meaning the word 'ethicity' can be taken as being closer to morality 
than ethics, as it is also concerned with practice, not rules or system of rules formulated 
in ethics. 
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That is, the ethicity of deconstruction can be named 'ethics-in-difference' 
as being sensitive to variety it pays more attention to differences and 
consciously accepts them. 
In de Man's theory, the new term of ethicity is strongly connected 
with the practice of reading, more exactly, the allegorical reading practice. 
In Allegories of Readings his analyses are about the universality and the 
impossibility of Reading (written with capital 'r') as he says "any narrative 
(that is, story-telling) is primarily the allegory of his own reading . . . the 
allegory of reading narrates the impossibility of reading" (de Man AR, 76-7). 
However good we are as readers, we inevitably fail to read allegories due to 
the fact that a rhetorical trope says one thing and always means another, and 
its final reading thus becomes impossible. For de Man, "Reading" (written in 
quotation marks and capitalized)—also as an allegory—"includes not just 
. . . the act of reading works of literature, but sensation, perception, and 
therefore every human act whatsoever" (Miller ER, 58). That is, it gives "the 
ground and foundation of human life" (Miller ER, 48) and, consequently, in 
a given text, event or experience we cannot reach a totality of understanding; 
that is, we cannot have a single, definitive interpretation. 
De Man's theory certainly can be applied to de Man's reading of his 
own text or my understanding of his reading. In his Ethics of Reading J. 
H. Miller as a good reader tries to understand the impossible and reads de 
Man's ideas on ethicity in one of his chapters titled "Reading Unreadability: 
de Man". Analysing the famous quotation, Miller calls attention to the way 
de Man rejects the traditional, basically Kantian theory of ethics. Though de 
Man still uses the words, 'category' and 'imperative' alluding to the Kantian 
'categorical imperative', for him the ethical category is neither subjective, 
nor transcendental—but linguistic. Being taken as a linguistic phenomenon, 
the ethical refers to a necessary element in language and life, namely that 
"we cannot help making judgments of right or wrong or commanding others 
to act according to those judgments (or) condemning them for not doing 
so"—says Miller (Miller ER, 46). 
In his chapter on de Man's ethicity, he also emphasises the exis-
tential importance of reading and the fictional' (imagined sequence of 
allegories) nature of the (neverending) process of understanding that 
"mix(es) tropological, allegorical, referential, ethical, political, and historical 
dimensions" (Miller ER, 44). As de Man claims, the ethical just like the 
allegorical is only one of the possible 'discursive modes'; not a primary, 
but a secondary or a tertiary category, that is, they do not and cannot 
come first in textual understanding. Then what comes first? Referring again 
to the quotation it clearly says that the reading process starts from "a 
figure (or a system of figures) and its deconstruction", then due to its 
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deconstruction it is followed (endlessly) by a sequence of "supplementary 
figurái superposition" which tells "the unreadability of the prior narration". 
And these narratives—actually generated by the primary one are called 
allegorical narratives or allegories telling "the story of the failure to read" 
(de Man AR, 205). 
Thus, right at the beginning of understanding we have rhetorical figures; 
more exactly, language with its determining laws. And—following de Man's 
ideas—I can say this is the very first and the very last moment when the 
word 'right' can be truly used, as starting our reading of a text with its 
rhetorical figures, we must (truly) enter its false world. Although we are 
in the realm of falsehood, being good readers we try to read it right; and, 
what's more, the ethical appears in this contextualized falsehood. For de 
Man "the term ethical designates the structural interference of two distinct 
value systems" referring to the epistemologicai true-false and the ethical 
right-wrong value-pairs. That is, in an allegorical reading a statement cannot 
be both true and right at once, as "it is impossible to respond simultaneously 
to those two demands" (Miller ER, 49). 
Therefore instead of using the expression 'ethical value', de Man speaks 
about 'the ethical category' regarding it as an imperative: as an obligation it 
is taken absolute and unconditional. Both Miller and de Man (and I myself) 
struggle with the real meaning of de Man's ethicity—as can be expected in a 
text claiming the unreadability of reading. Miller quotes another interesting 
passage, where de Man clearly names his 'true' categorical imperative: "in 
the case of reading of a text, what takes place is a necessary understanding... 
an understanding is an epistemologicai event prior to being an ethical or 
aesthetic value" (Miller ER, 51-52). I think it becomes obvious that de 
Man knows only one imperative: the imperative of language with its—quite 
hermeneutical—'read!' or 'understand!'. Returning to the central de Manian 
principle, Miller concludes that "to live is to read, or rather to commit 
again and again the failure to read which is the human lo t . . . each reading 
is strictly speaking, ethical, in the sense that it has to take place, by an 
implacable necessity, as a response to a categorical demand" (Miller ER, 
59). Our world is full of texts and systems of signs, which we are bound to 
understand; we cannot help reading, but we should accept that we cannot 
go beyond the borders of language. And we also have to accept that the 
ethical is only one of the possible but necessary referential modes of our 
reading. 
Actually, Miller tries to read and interpret de Man's theory of the 
'rhetorical close-reading' from an ethical point of view, but he himself cannot 
escape from falling into the traps of the rhetorical, of language. At the 
end of his reading on de Man's ethicity, Miller answers his own question 
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using the tricky affirmative of double negation. He says that in de Man's 
case "(the) ethics of reading imposes on the reader the 'impossible' task of 
reading unreadability, but that does not by any means mean that reading, 
even 'good' reading, cannot take place and does not have a necessary ethical 
dimension" (Miller EE, 59. Italics are mine). 
On the whole, Miller's effort, aimed at showing the ethics of reading in 
de Man's ethicity, cannot be seen as really convincing. Miller is apologizing 
all time that he is only a reader (and cannot be anybody else), which 
also means that he must be mistaken if he thinks his own reading as a 
definitive one. Despite of it being a 'mission impossible' he still insists on the 
necessity of the ethical in understanding, and works out his ethics of reading, 
relying on de Man's ethical-linguistic imperative expressed in the allegorical 
reading. Thus in the following chapters after interpreting de Man's ethicity, 
he explores passages from three novelists' (George Eliot, Anthony Trollope 
and Henry James) works. Although in his introductory "Reading Doing 
Reading" Miller confesses that his selection of texts and their ordering is 
not innocent, he claims that he at random chose his examples. Let us believe 
him in the case of the literary works, but I strongly doubt that the second 
chapter written on the famous de Manian passage resulted from an arbitrary 
choice. The same is true of the other topic dealt with in the previous chapter, 
since the very first chapter is concerned with Kant's categorical imperative. 
In fact, towards the end of the chapter on de Man's 'unreadable 
reading', Miller quotes Kant's concluding sentence in Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) about the 
incomprehensibility of the moral imperative: "And so we do not indeed 
comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative; 
yet we do not comprehend its incomprehensibility, which is all that can be 
fairly demanded of a philosophy which in its principles strives to reach the 
limit of human reason" (Miller ER, 56). According to Miller, while Kant, to 
some extent, still believed in the ability of language and reason to formulate 
an understanding of a nonlinguistic impossibility, de Man regards the moral 
imperative and reason as aspects of language and language cannot be used 
to understand/to read its own limitation. 
In a chapter titled "Reading Telling: Kant", Miller tries to understand 
and deconstruct the Kantian categorical imperative to show an example of 
his (mysterious) ethics of reading. The English translation of the well-known 
apodictic formula2 goes "I always should act as if my private maxim were 
2
 ". . .ich soli niemals anders verfahren, als so, dass ich auch wollen könne, meine 
Maximé solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden." I basically rely on the English translation 
of the Kantian formula quoted in Miller's work, but I also consulted with the original 
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to be universal legislation for all mankind" or in another way "I should 
never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should 
be a universal law" (Kant 21). In the formula, Miller calls our attention 
to the usage of 'as if' (als so) and 'in such a way' together with the 
mode of past subjunctive (cf.unreal past): to accept the Kantian categorical 
imperative, we should use our imagination. That is, with this a Is so we must 
enter the world of fiction, and having created a fictitious context, a little 
novel, we shall be able to tell whether or not the action is moral. Miller 
again emphasises that narrative or story-making gives the basic activity of 
the human mind together with the ability of telling stories to each other 
and understanding them; that is, (again) we cannot help reading. He finds 
that "narrative serves for Kant as the absolutely necessary bridge without 
which there would be no connecting between law as such and any particular 
ethical rule of behaviour" (Miller ER, 28). Moreover, Miller finds it is quite 
interesting that in his sytem, Kant regarded his third critique, Critique of 
Judgment (work of art), as serving as a bridge between epistemology (the 
work of pure reason) and ethics (the work of practical reason) separated by 
a deep chasm. 
Then, among other passages, Miller quotes a footnote from Foundations 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, in which Kant tries to give what he means 
by the expression, 'to act from respect (Achtung) for law', claiming that 
"respect can be regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not as 
the cause of the law... All respect for a person is only respect for the law 
of which the person provides an example" (Miller ER, 18. Italics are mine). 
Here it is again expressed that in our life we are related to the ethical through 
finding analogies and reading stories. We can judge a person or an act as 
ethical, because we find him or it being analogous to the incomprehensible 
law: as if human beings and their life events or narrated stories were used 
as rhetorical figures of speech (signs) referring to the moral imperative. 
According to Miller, this footnote reveals the Kantian reading of ethics, 
as he finds that the author reads himself or re-reads his own text. As Miller 
says "at such moments an author turns back on himself, so to speak, turns 
back on a text he or she has written, re-reads it, and, it may be, performs an 
act which can be called an example of the ethics of reading" (Miller ER, 15). 
In this sentence it is revealed that this moment is not a necessity in every 
text, as it may happen. But for Miller, or me, the deconstructive reader, 
who exactly pays attention to those moments, it means a necessity, a must, 
and the self-reading blindness of the chosen texts becomes the insight of the 
German text, Gruridlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Werkausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982). 
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ethics of reading in his/my understanding. Since throughout he suggests 
keeping in mind that his "interest is not in ethics as such hut in the ethics 
cf reading and in the relation of the ethical moment in reading to relation 
in the sense of giving account, telling a story, narrating" (Miller EE, 15). 
But being a deconstructor, Miller cannot give a relaxing conclusion 
of his reading of the Kantian ethics. In the last pages he discusses the 
performative act of promising offered by the Kantian categorical imperative. 
Unfortunately, the example Kant gives is one of false promise, which "does 
not exemplify that of which it is meant to be an example" (Miller EE, 36). 
Miller with great pleasure displays Kant's blindness or slip of the tongue 
concluding that in the end the good reader is to be confronted by not the 
moral law, not even a good example of it, but by the unreadability of the 
text. The promise is made in language, and it cannot promise anything but 
itself with its own unfathomed abyss. To quote Miller's judgment: "The 
example, he (Kant) assures us, will serve as the safe bridge between (the 
universal law) and (the particular case). Instead of that, the example divides 
itself within itself between two possible but incompatible readings and so 
becomes unreadable. The bridge which was to vault over the abyss between 
universal and particular law opens another chasm within itself" (Miller 
ER, 35). Thinking of the bridge-metaphor, we can remember the vault of 
New Criticism and it can be concluded that both of them, the modernist 
and postmodernist metaphors of reading, remain in the realm of figurative 
falsehood'. 
Thus, in texts the ethical can be said to basically mean the introduction 
of a universal 'must'. As Miller summarises: 
In what I call 'the ethical moment' there is a claim made on the author 
writing the work, on the narrator telling the story within the fiction of 
the novel, on the characters within the story at their decisive moments 
of their lives, and on the reader, teacher, or critic responding to the 
work. This ethical 'I must' cannot. . . be accounted for by the social 
and historical forces that impinge upon it. In fact the ethical moment 
contests these forces or is subversive of them (Miller EE, 8). 
Now, we can ask the question: why is it so important for the de constructors 
to insist on the existence of such discursive modes, namely, the ethical, 
the social, the political or the historical, which sound quite odd in their 
rhetorical analyses? In his introduction, Miller says that his provocative 
choosing of the title and topic, 'ethics of reading' can be explained by the 
attacks on deconstruction, as it is often labelled as 'nihilistic', 'ahistorical', 
'relativist', 'immoral' or 'negative' (Miller ER, 9). In spite of these mistaken, 
or at least awkward, polemics being aimed at calling against the rhetorical-
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deconstructive reading practice, they obviously appear as a necessity in the 
course of the history of literary criticism and theory. 
On the whole, as Jonathan Loesberg remarks "the most virulent 
charge against deconstruction [is] its aestheticism [which] stands as a vague 
synonym for imagining a realm of art entirely separate from social or 
historical effects and then advocating an escape into that 'unreal', aesthetic 
universe" (Loesberg 3). On the one hand, I think, the Yale-critics would 
answer that there is no escape beyond language and textual understanding. 
They would also say that they really do work hard as reading needs 
continuous efforts, and they should follow a must: a linguistic necessity, 
which can be called a hermeneutical or ethical imperative. On the other 
hand, deconstruction as a new mode of criticism (cf. new new criticism) 
appeared in the last few decades of the 20th century, and the end of the 
previous centuries were similarly marked by the atmosphere of decadence— 
with the signs of nihilism, hedonism, pessimism and escapist fantasies,3 
But there is a crucial difference between deconstruction and other 
decadent theories of art: it is its strong sense of responsibility. In The Ethics 
of Reading—following de Man's idea on the necessity of reading—Miller 
claims that "each reading is, strictly speaking, ethical, in the sense that it 
has to take place, by an implacable necessity, as a response to a categorical 
demand, and in the sense that the reader must take responsibility for it and 
for its consequences" (Miller EE, 59). And here the word 'reader' can not 
only refer to the writer and his invented figures, but also critics, teachers 
q 
I especially find one period close to deconstruction in its ideas: English Victorianism 
with its central theorist, Walter Pater. The movement called the English I'art pour I'art, 
'art for art 's sake5, which meant that a circle of the novelists and painters was basically 
centered around or related to Pater himself and all the members were also attacked due 
to their 'sinful' aestheticism. In spite of the differences between the two kinds of criticism, 
the question of the ethical in the aesthetical emphatically appeared in both of them. Let 
me refer to a particular work now: Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray. Despite the 
scandaleous nature of the work with its welcoming of amorality, new hedonism, worship 
of art and Greek spirit in love (cf. homosexuality), it offers a puzzling ending. Dorian 
Gray wishes to remain handsome and pure, while his portrait, his 'magical mirror', is 
getting old and marked by his sinful deeds. In the end he tries to destroy the portrait, 
the only witness to his ugly and unjust life, but he dies while his portrait gets back the 
original purity and goodness of his youth. How can we interpret the ending? In Dorian's 
death we can claim the victory of art over life, but the villain is punished. Consequently, 
we can read the ending as a moral conclusion united with the perfection of art, which 
Wilde called the expression of "ethical beauty" (quoted in Ellmann 321). See "The New 
Aestheticism". In Ellmann, Richard. Oscar Wilde. NY: Vintage Books, 1988. 
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and students, since all of us are involved, must be involved, in the process of 
Reading. And in a later work titled Victorian Subjects Miller emphatically 
connects the problem of responsibility expressed in the ethics of reading 
with the obligation of teachers. Being a reader, the teacher is also obliged 
to submit himself or herself to "the truth of the linguistic imperative" of 
reading, that is, to "the power of the words of the text over the mind" 
(Miller VS, 255). In this sense the teacher is taken as a revealer, not a 
creator and the way Miller describes the teacher's ethical reading is similar 
to the Socratic method: 
The obligation of the reader, the teacher, and the critic would seem to 
be exclusively epistemological. The reader must see clearly what the 
work in question says and repeat that meaning in his commentary 
or teaching. He functions thereby, modestly as an intermediary, as 
a midwife or catalyst He transmits meanings which are objectively 
there but which might not otherwise have reached readers or students. 
He brings the meaning to birth again as illumination and insight 
in their minds, making the interaction take place without himself 
entering into it or altering it. It would seem that the field covered 
by reading involves exclusively the epistemological categories of truth 
and falsehood, insight and blindness. (Miller VS, 237). 
I am sure the tone of this description can be felt as being quite ironic, 
and we should remember that the Socratic method itself was based on irony. 
We can wonder if the deconstructors think it is impossible to Read—that is, 
to give a definitive reading of a text—what is happening in the seminars. The 
answer is 'obvious': reading is happening as it is bound to take place. Maybe, 
it sounds strange after all these theoretical analyses, but being a teacher of 
English literature4 I agree with the Yale-critics, who work or worked as 
teachers, that the questioning Socratic way is useful in teaching. Certainly, 
all of us are aware of the fact that—like in the Socratic dialogues—the 
questions are directed. Yet in the ethics of reading they are directed not 
by the teacher, but by the text: its rhetoric and linguistic imperative. This 
makes it possible for every student to read the text in his or her own way, 
while the teacher acts as mediator and moderator at the same time. 
I think that besides acting like a 'midwife' and encouraging the 
imaginative reading skill of the students, a good teacher needs something 
else—a sense of irony. Irony is needed to accept the students' different views 
4
 Though I obtained my PhD-degree in philosophy (more exactly, in aesthetics), I 
teach history of English literature and literary theory at the Department of English 
Studies. Actually, the combination of my present occupation and my philosophical 
attitude has resulted in my interest in the rhetoric and ethics of reading. 
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on the texts, and so keep the varied lines of thought together. But this 
deconstructive irony means more than simply referring to a trope since it 
is an attitude, an openness towards reality, ethicity, reading, and teaching 
that is based on the ability of shifting points of view. It marks the ability 
of avoiding to claim this or that interpretation as the final one, while giving 
the experience of reading to each and every student. And I am sure it cannot 
be done without accepting that the final reading, Reading, is unattainable, 
which we should admit cannot be done without irony. I hope to have fulfilled 
my—hopefully, not a false—promise of discussing 'the rhetoric and ethics 
of reading', and you have been 'its' (and also my) good readers. 
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